NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 30 | Number 2

Article 16

2-1-1952

Negligence -- Automobiles -- Sudden Appearance
Doctrine
Margaret P. Winslow

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Margaret P. Winslow, Negligence -- Automobiles -- Sudden Appearance Doctrine, 30 N.C. L. Rev. 183 (1952).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol30/iss2/16

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

1952]
20

and agent.
But it is hard to conceive that people engaged in a joint
enterprise for mutual pleasure consider themselves as agents of each
other. Another point which illustrates that the rule is a pure fiction,
with little if any basis in reality, is the fact that a member of a joint
enterprise is deemed by law to have a legal right to control the operation of the vehicle without having any actual control. A theoretical
right of control is thus a sufficient basis for imputing the negligence of
the driver to the passenger. Of course, if the passenger knows of approaching danger and fails to warn the driver, he himself may be liable
on the theory of actual negligence. 21
One argument in favor of enforcing the joint enterprise rule is the
fact that the parties enter into the transaction or enterprise of their own
free will. Likewise they have the choice of withdrawing at their pleasure.
One striking point about the present case is the fact that the occupants
of the patrol car were fellow employees. They were working for a
common employer. The plaintiff had no choice in the selection of the
person with whom he would be associated during the patrol job. He
either had to ride with the man assigned with him or stand the risk of
losing his job. In view of this situation the court might have ruled that
an important element-the privilege of quitting the venture at will22
was lacking, and therefore it was not a true joint enterprise.
ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, JR.

Negligence-Automobiles--Sudden Appearance Doctrine
In a recent action for the wrongful death of a child,' the North
Carolina Supreme Court applied, for the first time, the descriptive phrase
"sudden appearance" to a doctrine long recognized in automobile negligence cases. 2 This doctrine is applied in those cases where a motorist
strikes a theretofore unseen child who darts in front of his automobile.
Such an accident is regarded as unavoidable, thereby relieving the motorist of liability. 3 Generally, North Carolina has applied this doctrine
to cases where the child has run from behind another vehicle or has
0 Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925); 1 VARTANIAN, THE
LAW OF AUTOmOBILES, §59 (1947).

" Central of Georgia R. R. v. Watkins, 37 F. 2d 710 (5th Cir. 1930).
For a case exactly in point, with the same result as the principal case, see
Collins v. Graves, 17 Cal. App. 2d 288, 61 P. 2d 1198 (1936).
' Register v. Gibbs, 233 N. C. 456, 64 S. E. 2d 280 (1951).
'In Butler v. Alien, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S. E. 2d 561 (1951), decided one week
2

later, this phrase appears in the headnote but not in the opinion. This phrase has
been used by other courts, however. Christian v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 603, 51 S. E.

2d 857 (1949) ; Fultz' Adm'r. v. Williams, 266 Ky. 651, 99 S. W. 2d 803 (1936).

' See Notes, 113 A. L. R. 528, 536 (1938) ; 65 A. L. R. 192, 197 (1930). This
note does not deal with those cases involving the question of contributory negligence on the part of the child. See generally, Note, 107 A. L. R. 5 (1937).
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broken away from the control of an adult.
When the child has been visible for some distance, however, the
defendant is not relieved of liability, because such action should have
been anticipated. 5 This is true if the child was seen or could have been
seen by a proper lookout. The reasoning of the cases differs as to the
degree of care required. Some hold that more than ordinary care is
required. 6 Others only require ordinary care but recognize that the
vigilance of the operator varies with the age, physical condition, and
circumstances under which the child is seen. 7 Thus, the standard of
care remains the same, but the amount of diligence, attention, or effort
required varies. The expectation that children act heedlessly8 is merely
one circumstance to be considered. This, of course, means that "the
greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised." 03
While a motorist may reasonably presume that an adult will remain in
a place of safety,' 0 the prevailing view today requires an assumption
that a child may move into danger."

'Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66, 173 S. E. 43 (1934); Kennedy v. Lookadoo,
203 N. C. 640, 166 S. E. 752 (1932) ; Fisher v. Deaton, 196 N. C. 461, 146 S. E.
66 (1928). But cf. Mills v. Moore, 219 N. C. 25, 12 S. E. 2d 661 (1940) (eighteenmonth-old whose presence in the road could not be explained was struck by defendant's truck; nonsuit was allowed because it was highly speculative as to whether
defendant could have seen the child; four-to-three decision with vigorous dissent by
Justice Seawell.).
In Green v. Bowers, 230 N. C. 651, 55 S.E. 2d 651 (1949), and Bass v. Hocutt,
221 N. C. 218, 19 S. E. 2d 871 (1942), new trials were granted because of the failure
of the trial court to charge the jury concerning the possibility that the act of the
child was the proximate cause of the injury.
Butler v. Allen, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S. E. 2d 561 (1951) ; Register v. Gibbs,
233 N. C. 456, 64 S.E. 2d 280 (1951) ; Yokeley v. Kearns, 223 N. C. 196, 25 S. E.
2d 602 (1943); Caulder v. Motor Sales, Inc., 221 N. C. 437, 20 S. E. 2d 338
(1942) ; Smith v. Miller, 209 N. C. 170, 183 S.E. 370 (1935) ; Moore v. Powell,
205 N. C. 636, 172 S. E. 327 (1934); Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S.E.
169 (1928). But cf. Parks v. Willis, 228 N. C. 25, 44 S. E. 2d 343 (1947) (nonsuit reversed where six-year-old evidently ran out from a garage across street and
fell under the rear wheels of a truck which had turned to avoid hitting her; the
truck was exceeding the speed limit by five miles per hour) ; Hughes v. Thayer,
229 N. C. 773, 51 S.E. 2d 488 (1949) (two children alighted from a school bus;
one ran across safely in front of the bus, but the other, an eight-year-old, waited
for the bus and two cars following to pass, then ran across the road in front of
defendant's car approaching from the other direction.).
'Yokeley v. Kearns, supra note 5; Kelly v. Hunsucker, 211 N. C. 153, 189
S. E. 664 (1936) ; Smith v. Miller, siepra note 5; Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66,
173 S.E. 43 (1934) ; Moore v. Powell, supra note 5; Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C.
213. 145 S.E. 169 (1928) ; State v. Gray, 180 N. C. 697, 104 S.E. 647 (1920). '
'In Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575, 35 S. E. 2d 871 (1945), Justice Barnhill
attempted to clarify the misconception that a higher standard of care is required,
stating that there are no degrees of care in fixing responsibility for negligence.
The motorist is only held to the standard of care which a prudent man would have
used under the circumstances.
'Hughes v. Thayer, 229 N. C. 773, 51 S.E. 2d 488 (1949) ; Yokeley v. Kearns,
223 N. C. 196, 25 S.E. 2d 602 (1943) ; Smith v. Miller, 209 N. C. 170, 183 S.E.
370 9 (1935); Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66, 173 S.E. 43 (1934).
REST.ATEmENT, TORTS, §298 (1947).
"oFox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66, 173 S.E. 43 (1934) ; Bryan v. Fewell, 191 Va.
647,"62
S.E. 2dv.39Luckow,
(1950). 219 Iowa 1048, 258 N. W. 685 (1935);
Webster
Hughes v.
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Another situation where the doctrine of "sudden appearance" is
inapplicable is where the driver has been guilty of some negligent act
which made it impossible to see the child or to avoid the accident after
seeing the child. 12 So, where a child darts out from beside the road,
and the driver is going at such an excessive rate of speed that he is
unable to stop before striking the child, he cannot escape liability under
13
this doctrine.
Whether the driver saw, or could have seen, the child in time to
avoid a collision, and whether, once seen, he exercised the care of a
reasonable, prudent man to avoid a collision, is always a question of
fact. But once it is established that the child was or should have been
seen, the doctrine of "sudden appearance" becomes inapplicable, and the
tendency of most courts is to hold the driver to an almost absolute
liability. 14
MARGARET P. WINSLOW.

Negligence-Railroads-Custom as Evidence
Defendant's train was blocking a city street for longer than five
minutes, in violation of a municipal ordinance, when plaintiff attempted
to climb between the cars in order to return to his place of employment.
The train was suddenly moved without signal injuring plaintiff. The district court excluded evidence of a long standing custom for persons to
climb between railroads cars which blocked the crossing, and dismissed
on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In
Stratton v. Southern Ry.,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Thayer, 229 N. C. 773, 51 S.E. 2d 488 (1949) ; Price v. Burton, 155 Va. 229, 154
S. E. 499 (1930).
But see Brown v. Wade, 145 So. 790 (La. App. 1933), where the court stated
that a driver could assume that a child would stay on an urban sidewalk, but could
not so assume as to a child on a county road; Faatz v. Sullivan, 199 Iowa 875,
200 N. W. 321 (1924), where a boy was struck by defendant after he had passed
pathway of car when he retraced his steps, the Supreme Court held the jury
should have been told that driver of automobile had right to assume that the boy
having reached a place of safety would either remain there or continue on his
journey; Moeller v. Packard, 86 Cal. App. 459, 261 Pac. 135 (1927) ; Hutcheson
v. Misenheimer, 169 Va. 511, 194 S.E. 665 (1938).
" Butler v. Allen, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S.E. 2d 561 (1951) ; Kelly v. Hunsucker,
211 N. C. 153, 189 S. E. 664 (1936) ; Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S.E.
169 (1928) ; Harper v. Crislip, 103 Va. 514, 138 S.E. 93 (1927).
where
2 Butler v. Allen, 233 N. C. 484, 487, 64 S. E. 2d 561, 563 (1951), ...
one is driving an automobile at a speed in excess of the statutory limit, or at a
greater speed than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing,
the mere fact that a child suddenly runs in front of the moving vehicle, does not
necessarily relieve the driver from liability. There still remains the question
whether the negligent driving of the automobile made it impossible for the driver
of the car, under the circumstances, to avoid the accident after seeing the child,
or whether by the exercise of reasonable care, such driver could have seen the
child in time to avoid the injury."
"' See note 3 supra.
' 190 F. 2d 917 (4th Cir. 1951).

